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Abstract:
This paper investigates the racial differences in salaries amongst professional basketball players
during the 2011-2012 season. Prior studies from the 1980s and 1990s show that white and black
players have earned a comparable mean salary, based on performance variables and other player
characteristics. However these studies have shown, that taking race in as a factor when running
regressions of the data, preference exists towards white player salaries. This paper looks to see if
the recent shift in demographic makeup of the NBA prevalent during the late 1990s and 2000s has
led to a more equitable distribution of salaries based on race, holding all variables of past studies
constant. OLS regression results reveal that during the 2011-2012 NBA season a 15% premium
paid to white players continues to exist despite comparable player statistics and mean
compensation.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Salary discrimination has been an issue plaguing the workforce in the United States since
the Emancipation Proclamation in which Abraham Lincoln set blacks free, making them equal to
whites. Since the emancipation of blacks, countless legislation has been passed constitutionally
strengthening and further defining their rights as compared to those of the “normal” white
individual. One such law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, made it illegal to discriminate in one’s
wages based on race, color, sex, or nationality. This law was passed in order to eliminate the
discrimination between races in the workforce in terms of their salaries; however the right this law
intended to serve has not held up over time. Past studies by other researchers show this existence
of wage discrimination plaguing minorities from the 1970s up through the 2000s in fields such as
education and other labor market sectors (Blinder, 1973; Meir et al., 1989; Reskin, 2000).
The National Basketball Association (NBA) would seem to be an unlikely place to find
traces of racial discrimination given its historically diverse makeup. During the 2010-2011 season
blacks composed roughly 82% of the total players. The majority of NBA players over the last
couple of decades have been black, which in turn has resulted in many of the big name stars being
of colored ethnicity. Therefore, many find it surprising that despite the dominance of black
presence in professional basketball, studies done throughout the years have revealed evidence of
salary discrimination against black players beginning from the 1970s through the late 1990s.
This study aims to enhance the understanding of discrimination in professional sports,
specifically basketball, and its effects on player salaries. With the changing demographics of the
American labor force it is important to determine if the existence of salary disparity is still an issue
prevalent for workers coming into a market previously dominated by a single race. A further
analysis of current data built off prior empirical models will give insight into whether or not the
combination of employer and customer discrimination found to exist in the 1980s and 1990s NBA
seasons still exist in today’s professional league (Kahn and Sherer, 1988; Hamilton, 1997).
This paper was driven by multiple research objectives that help to differentiate its research
from prior papers: First, it aims to look at how the recent major shift in rising demographic makeup,
in not only black but other international players, will impact the previous racial salary
discrimination. Second, it examines to see if today’s generation, a time of greater racial acceptance,

results in decreased consumer discrimination mitigating prior salary gaps. Last, it analyzes the
salary discrimination topic with data 13 years newer than any past paper. The void of current
empirical insight into the topic of salary discrimination amongst players in the NBA leaves
necessity for an up-to-date investigation of this issue. This paper will successfully bridge the gap
between past research and the present status of this debate, given the current changes in data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of the trends
in the data used for this research. Section 3 gives a brief literature review of past papers. Section
4 outlines the data and methodology behind the empirical model. Finally, section 5 presents and
discusses the empirical results. This is followed by a conclusion in section 6, in which the
significance of the findings is stated.
2.0 TRENDS IN SPORTS AND INCOME
The presence of colored and international players in professional sports has been an area
of great progress since the first appearance of such players in the 1940s and 1950s. With equality
becoming a forefront issue in politics during this time frame of American history, advancements
were able to be made on the behalf of minorities such as the breaking of the color barrier in
professional sports. Since the breaking of the color barrier all areas of professional sports have
seen a noticeable to dramatic increase in their demographic makeup. Figure 1 shows the percentage
of Sports Illustrated covers that have identifiable race subject matter, broken down by
color/ethnicity, from 1959 to 2009. As it can be seen, the percentage of Sports Illustrated covers
for minorities has been steadily increasing during this time frame while that of whites has been
decreasing. This trend confirms and demonstrates that the overall percentage of non-white players
in professional sports has been increasing as well as their notoriety since the breaking of the color
barrier in professional sports.

Figure 1: Race on Sports Illustrated Covers

Source: O’Connor Sports Illustrated Study
Specifically, Figures 2 & 3 show how the demographic makeup of the National Basketball
Association has greatly moved towards African American or Black dominance since their entrance
into the sport in the 1950s. With each successive year, the number of white players has drastically
decreased whereas the percentage of black players has risen to around 78% in 2008, currently at
82% in 2010. While the percentage of Blacks and other minorities in sports is on an upward trend
in terms of representation, it is faltering in other aspects.
Figure 2: Percentage of Black players in the NBA

Source: Race and Gender Report Card 2010
Figure 3: Racial Breakdown of Professional Sports

Source: Race and Gender Report Card 2011
Discrimination and differences in salary amongst Blacks and Whites have been notable
issues in labor forces for years and still occur today. Figure 4 shows the real median household
incomes by race from 1967 to 2010. It can be seen through the data presented about real median
income that whites have, consistently throughout the years, held a premium in income over the
incomes of minorities, excluding the Asian numbers. This disparity in income not only persists in
the general market of labor but transfers over into the market of professional sports. A study of the
1985-1986 salaries of professional basketball players by Kahn and Sherer (1988) reveals a 20%
premium is paid to white players over black players given the same player characteristics and stats.
This trend in salary discrimination continues to carry through into the 1990s as noted by
Hamilton’s (1997) study, determining that while the salary gap shrank, Whites’ still earn 18%
higher than Blacks still holding constant for player ability.
Figure 3: Real Median Household Income by Race: 1967-2010

Source: U.S Census Bureau, Current Population Survey
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Salary disparity amongst individuals of differing races has been an issue heavily studied
and analyzed by researchers over the last several decades. Three of these studies on racial wage
gaps were done by Blinder (1973), Cotton (1988), and Neil and Johnson (1996). These studies
indicate that indifferences in employee salaries must be looked at while controlling for worker
knowledge, skill, and productivity in order to properly measure potential discrimination. Through
regression-based models, these papers, Neil and Johnson (1996) specifically, reveal that racial
disparity in wages do exist and are heavily driven by a skill gap. This skill gap is believed to be in
part from each individual’s family background; it was found that black familial backgrounds
resulted in their less educated parents and fewer resources. The impacts, therefore, are fueled by
the racial background of their family, showing that race led to a skill gap that transferred over into
wage disparity. These studies show the effects of race in the labor market and the corresponding
salaries earned by its employees. What is left to be answered however, is how and if the disparity
found in past studies of general labor markets exists in spectator markets such as sports.
The basis of salary discrimination in sports arises from the fact that, despite black and white
players being equally productive in performance, they still may earn unequal pay. To understand
possible premises of salary disparity in professional sports the concepts and models of employer
& customer prejudice by Becker (1971) must be taken into consideration. The Becker model for

employer prejudice offers Blacks a wage rate at some fraction less than that of a White’s: Wb = Ww
(1 - d), where d > 0 and represents a function of the employer’s dislike for black employees. The
larger the value of d the greater the prejudice of the employer. Becker’s model of customer
discrimination is similar in structure. The model is representative of a customer’s higher perceived
value and willingness to pay for identical services or products produced by whites over blacks: Pb
= Pw (1 - c), where c > 0. Becker (1971) argues that the more visible black content a product has
the less customers are willing to pay for it, as c represents consumer distaste.
A prime example of the theory of customer discrimination can be seen in the market for
sports memorabilia as shown in the paper by Nardinelli and Simons (1990). Their study in
particular looks at the market for baseball cards separated into two categories of pitchers and hitters
for white and non-white players. While controlling for the different statistics of each player group,
their findings indicate that non-white players’ cards sell for 10 percent less than those of whites
for hitters and 13 percent less for pitchers. Although they admit that the baseball cards do not
represent a large market, meaning that their results may not be the most precise proof of customer
discrimination, they do believe that the sports collector is a strong representative of overall sports
fans and therefore is a sufficient representation of customer discrimination in sports. An even
stronger connection can be made between sports and consumer prejudice if one was to look at
personal interaction of players and fans, i.e. impact upon professional salaries (Nardinelli and
Simons 1990).
Following the Becker model of discrimination into the sport of professional basketball,
Kahn and Sherer (1988) claim that customer discrimination is what led to the disparity in salaries
amongst players in the NBA during the 1985-1986 season. Their research reveals a 20% premium
paid to white players over black, holding constant all other factors. An equal mean compensation
across all players shows that the variance in pay stems solely from race and not player statistics or
other characteristics. They believe this discrimination comes from the fact that owners are willing
to pay white players, with skills comparable to those of black players, a higher salary since fans
are more interested in seeing white players over black. Kahn and Sherer (1988) draw upon this
conclusion through their empirical results showing that replacing a single black player with a white
one is able to increase home attendance from 8,000 to 13,000 fans per season. They believe the

reasoning for the prevalent customer discrimination arises from the fact that basketball players are
much more visible than players of other sports, on and off the bench. Since teams are only
composed of a maximum of 15 players and less than half of them are able to play at once,
consumers have a much more direct interaction with the players than with those of other
professional sports leading to higher potential levels of customer discrimination.
Hamilton (1997) furthers Kahn and Sherer’s (1988) study by looking at the continuation
of the discrimination of salaries in professional basketball given more recent data from the 19941995 season. Hamilton (1997) not only examines the salary gap between white and black players
but also looks at the distribution of the salaries. Through his research he was able to show that at
the low end of the salary distribution whites in fact did earn less; however it was not statistically
significant. The other portion of empirical evidence coincided with the findings of Kahn and Sherer
(1988) in which Whites earned an 18 percent premium over blacks at the high end of the
distribution. These findings were consistent with a form of customer discrimination in which fans
prefer to see white star players, representative of the high end of the distribution, all else equal
(Hamilton 1997).
Contrary to these empirical findings on customer discrimination, i.e in professional sports
such as basketball, were two other studies done regarding the professional sports of football and
soccer. According to the research done by Gius and Johnson (2000), non-white players actually
earn 10 percent more than white players. While experience, position, and draft status were all
shown to be important factors in determining a player’s salary, they were able to prove that a
reverse wage disparity based upon race may exist in the NFL. Unlike many of the other
professional sports, soccer had a mixed result in discrimination results dependent on where its
market took place. While Reilly and Witt (1995, 2007) and Medcalfe (2007) show that no unequal
treatment in regards to player salary based on race exists in the English Premier league or the MLS
in America, Szymanski (2000) found evidence to show that these findings are dependent on
location in which the market takes place. Szymanski (2000) argues that since the scope of soccer
is so far reaching across multiple cultures, that market discrimination can take effect if the market
exists in a region with known prejudice towards outside racial groups.

4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
The study uses National Basketball Association player characteristics and performance data from
the 2011-2012 season. Data for the research was obtained and compared between several different
sources. All player data was compiled and contrasted between the following three sites to ensure
accuracy and completeness: NBAstuffer.com, Basketball-reference.com (a partner of USA Today
Sports), and ESPN. Data for players traded during the 2011-2012 season was followed through
between teams to represent their complete statistics for the entirety of the season. Summary
statistics for the data are provided in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3.
Table 1 Summary Statistics (Black & White)
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Table 2 Summary Statistics (Black players)
Variable

Obs.

SALARY

308

POS

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

4,932,775

4,915,910

61,433

25,244,493

308

0.53

0.50

0.00

1.00

SEAS

308

5.0

4.0

0.0

19.0

MPG

308

23.3

7.5

10.1

39.2

PPG

308

9.34

5.30

1.10

28.00

FT_

308

0.730

0.131

0.000

1.000

APG

308

2.1

1.8

0.1

11.7

RPG

308

4.0

2.3

0.7

14.5

BPG

308

0.48

0.49

0.00

3.65

SPG

308

0.77

0.40

0.10

2.52

PF

308

92

48

8

257
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Table 3 Summary Statistics (White players)
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

SALARY

90

4,680,310

4,002,155

473,604

19,092,873

POS

90

0.70

0.46

0.00

1.00

SEAS

90

5.0

4.0

0.0

15.0

MPG

90

22.6

7.6

10.5

38.8

PPG

90

8.74

4.94

1.70

26.00

FT_

90

0.710

0.169

0.000

0.911

APG

90

2.0

2.0

0.2

10.7

RPG

90

4.3

2.5

1.1

13.4

BPG

90

0.50

0.46

0.00

2.00

SPG

90

0.65

0.34

0.07

2.22

PF

90

98

44

17

214

4.2 Empirical Model
This study adapts and modifies the empirical models constructed by Khan and Sherer (1988) and
Hamilton (1997). In both papers, player performance and characteristics were used as a basis in
creating an equation which determined their subsequent impact on player salary. Through the
omission and addition of several variables to the models used in past research, the new equation
could be written as follows:
Ln(SALARY) = ß0 + ß1RACE + ß2POS + ß3SEAS + ß4MPG +
ß5PPG + ß6FT_+ ß7APG + ß8RPG + ß9BPG + ß10SPG+ ß11PF + ê
SALARY is representational of the annual wage paid to professional players in the National
Basketball Association. SALARY is used as an endogenous variable. For modeling purposes, the
log of SALARY is taken in order to ease the interpretation of the independent variable coefficients;
a one unit increase in ‘X’, the explanatory variable, will result in a ß percent increase in Y.
Independent variables consist of seven variables obtained from various sources. Appendix
A provides a data source, acronyms, descriptions, and expected signs for the variables. First,
RACE represents the ethnicity of each basketball player. RACE is broken down into a dummy

variable with the values of 0 and 1. If a player is white the value of RACE is equal to 0 and if a
player is black the value is equal to 1. Second, POS corresponds to the position a player holds on
his team. For testing purposes, POS is also designed as a dummy variable and proxy for
FORWARD and GUARD, two variables used by Kahn and Sherer (1988) and Hamilton (1997).
Players were grouped into the more generalized subcategories of FORWARD and GUARD due to
the way in which coaches now structure their teams and playbook strategies. If POS is equal to 0
it signifies a player is a forward, whereas if POS is equal to 1 it signifies a player is a guard. Third,
SEAS illustrates the number of seasons a player has played in both the NBA and the ABA (prior
to their merger with the NBA); in layman’s terms the amount, measured in years, of professional
experience a player has. Fourth, MPG corresponds to the average minutes a player plays per game.
Fifth, PPG signifies the average points per game a player scores. Sixth, FT_ is representative of
each player’s free throw percentage for the 2011-2012 season. Seventh, APG stands for each
player’s average assists per game. Eighth, RPG signifies the average rebounds per game for each
player. Ninth, BPG represents a player’s average blocks per game over the entire season. Tenth,
SPG stands for the average steals per game for each player. Lastly, PF signifies the total number
of personal fouls a player receives over the course of the season.
5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results for the OLS regression of the aforementioned model are presented in Table
4 below. These results are in line and similarly model the results found by Kahn and Sherer (1988)
as well as Hamilton (1997) with slight variance amongst several variables. Estimation of the
regressions reveals that, out of the eleven independent variables, seven variables were statistically
significant ranging from the 1-10% levels. These seven variables, that proved to be significant,
consisted of RACE, POS, SEAS, MPG, PPG, FT_, and SPG. To the contrary, the variables APG,
RPG, BPG, and PF were found to be statistically insignificant. Estimation of the regression also
resulted in a R2 of .5442 as well as an F-statistic of 41.8988. These values indicate that there is an
overall good fit of the regression.
Of the eleven independent variables tested in the OLS regression, two of them did not
match their expected signs. The two variables were FT_ and SPG. While both were expected to

have a positive effect upon a player’s salary, in actuality they showed a negative impact. The
negative relationships the two variables have on salary do fall in line with the findings of Kahn
and Sherer (1988) and Hamilton (1997). However, the reasoning for the negative relationship
could be in part due to the fact that these factors are related to defensive tactics as opposed to
aggressive offensive pushes which have larger payoffs. Therefore, it might be said that higher rates
of steals and free-throws could indicate players are not capitalizing and not taking enough
advantage of strong offensive efforts, that pay off higher in points, but instead focus more on a
conservative or safer playing strategy. One variable, PF, which could have resulted in a positive
or negative relationship with salary, ended up generating a positive coefficient. While one would
assume that the more personal fouls a player has, the less they will get paid since each personal
foul results in one to two free throws for the opposing team, the contrary was found. This is most
likely due to the fact that it is common practice to have coaches instruct their players to foul the
opposing team as part of a strategy to stop the clock in the closing minutes of a game. Therefore,
it is not improbable that PF has a positive impact upon salary versus a negative one.
Interpretation of the coefficients of the explanatory variable helps to assess the variables’
relative impact upon the response variable, SALARY, ceteris paribus. With the mean data shown
in Tables 2 and 3 revealing a comparable basis for player statistics between both racial categories,
regression analysis of the estimated coefficients can be looked at comparatively regardless of a
player’s race. Based on results of the OLS model, the coefficient for POS exhibits a 20% increase
in a player’s salary if his position is a guard versus a forward. This value is statistically significant
at the 10% level. This disparity in salary dependent on position could be due to guards being the
more dominant players on the courts, in terms of leadership and ball control. By being the main
focal points on the team, these players could reap the benefits of consumer prejudice in increased
audience appeal, as referenced in the literature review section, and could simply demand a higher
salary since their position arguably has a higher work commitment.
Results also conclude that with each additional season an individual plays in the NBA, his
salary will increase roughly by 6%, at a 1% significance level. This increase in salary for each
additional year of experience may be attributed to the fact that players have been able to build
proven track records. Players have proven their worth by performing in a professional, high

intensity setting over the course of their careers, showing they can be relied upon and thus
garnishing higher wages. Further, SALARY increases 5.45% with each additional average minute
per game a player has. This estimated coefficient stands significant at the 1% level. The
explanation for the positive relationship between MPG and SALARY can be drawn from the idea
that the more time a player has on the court is a direct factor on his higher performance level, in
turn supporting higher salary. Similar to MPG, PPG also holds a positive relationship to SALARY
increasing it by 4.67% per unit increase of PPG, and is significant at the 1% level. Justification for
the positive sign of PPG can be found in the fact that the more points a player averages a game,
the better they are performing overall, warranting higher yearly salaries. The remaining four
positively related explanatory variables to SALARY are that of APG, RPG, BPG, and PF
increasing the responsive variable by 4%, .4%, 16%, and .05% respectively. Each of these,
however, is not significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels. The reasoning for holding no significance
at these levels can be attributed to the fact that these performance statistics hold little relation to
the actual skill and quality of each player. They are more secondary statistics to the player’s true
value or performance ability. Therefore, it is not surprising to see no significance in the estimated
coefficients of these variables.
Table 4: OLS Regression Results; dependent variable is ln SALARY
VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT

STD. ERROR

Constant

13.5008

0.2571

RACE

- 0.1494 *

0.0885

POS

0.2027 *

0.1072

SEAS

0.0622 ***

0.0068

MPG

0.0545 ***

0.0129

PPG

0.0467 ***

0.0154

FT_

- 0.7946 *

0.3075

APG

0.0424

0.0317

RPG

0.0041

0.0312

BPG

0.1616

0.1079

SPG

- 0.2691 **

0.1375

0.0005

0.0010

PF
R2

0.5442

F-statistic

41.8988

Number of Obs.

398

Note: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively

Analysis of the OLS estimation results also led to the conclusion of multiple explanatory
variables having a negative impact upon SALARY. The first of the three was that of a player’s
FT_, or free-throw percentage, showing that a one unit increase results in a 79% reduction in one’s
salary. This coefficient also held significant at the 10% level. The second of the negative
relationship variables was SPG. SPG, representative of steals per game, was estimated as affecting
SALARY by -26.9% per each unit increase, while being significant at the 5% level. The reasoning
for these negative relationships could be in part due to the fact that these factors are defense related
tactics as opposed to offense related, in which the payoffs are more beneficial for the team.
Therefore, it could be said that higher rates of steals and free-throws could indicate players are not
capitalizing and taking enough advantage of their team’s strong offensive efforts, that pay off
higher in points, but instead focusing on more conservative, safer playing strategies. The last
explanatory variable that has a negative impact on SALARY is the one of most importance that
this paper is framed around, RACE. Regression results show that RACE has a -14.94% impact
upon SALARY when its value is equal to 1, representative of being black. This estimation is also
significant at the 10% level.
With the results derived from the aforementioned empirical model, this study hopes to
influence the National Basketball Association to make the appropriate policy changes to correct
the long-standing salary disparity prevalent in its players’ wages. Such policy changes could be
the following: First, the NBA could use the formulas of the models used by Khan and Sherer
(1988) or Hamilton (1997), or those of this study, and plug in player statistical data in order to
generate appropriate player salaries based solely on performance. Another policy change that can

be carried out if the gap is to persist is to initiate a cap or limit on wage disparity between players
of equal performance. For example, if two players on the same team or different teams perform at
the same average level, there would be a cap that limits the percentile difference in their salaries.
In order to successfully accomplish this difference cap, changes would also need to take place in
overall team salary caps and some sort of salary equalization across the entire league.
While the results obtained from this study proved significant and relayed useful
information, several limitations existed that hinder the overall quality and exactness of the results.
One such example was the existence of balloon salaries on the higher end of the player salary
scale. These balloon salaries were extreme outliers that can be noted in Tables 2 and 3 in comparing
the mean and standard deviation columns to the maximum column. While these outliers did not
downplay the validity of the results, they most likely hindered the definitiveness of the estimated
coefficients. Another limitation experienced while carrying out this study was the inability to
factor in stadium attendance as done in the Khan and Sherer (1988) and Hamilton studies. These
past papers used home attendance in their empirical models as a variable to help explain and justify
salary disparity amongst different race players through customer discrimination modeled by
Becker (1971). However, through countless hours of research and attempts this information was
unable to be found through online databases. Therefore, this explanatory variable was forced to be
excluded in this paper’s model.

6.0 CONCLUSION
In summary, OLS regression analysis reveals a significant salary disparity still exists
amongst black and white professional basketball players in the National Basketball Association.
Estimation results show that white players still earn a 14.94% premium in salary over black players
given all other factors are equivalent. These results are in line with the findings of Kahn and Sherer
(1988) as well as Hamilton (1997). All three studies expose that white and black players earn an
equal mean compensation based on player characteristics and skills but when factoring in race as
a variable, prejudice comes to exist. However, a trend that emerges by comparing these studies

shows that while a disparity exists since the 1980s through today, the percentage at which white
players earn over blacks is steadily decreasing. The premium so far has decreased from 20% to
18% to roughly 15%, about 2% per decade.
The justification for these results can still be attributed to the model of customer
discrimination by Becker (1971). With the number of white players in the NBA remaining
increasingly minimal, consumers are still willing to pay top dollar to see these vanishing white
stars play. Therefore, to the contrary, the high number of black stars in the NBA is driving down
their respective salaries since their mixture of skills and personal characteristics are not as “rare”
as those of a white basketball player. Conclusively, professional teams are willing to pay skilled
white players more than their black counterparts since they are able to draw in a fan base willing
to pay more for a chance to see a team with a roster containing a white player. While this paper
did not factor in actual attendance data to completely justify the consumer discrimination model,
the findings of all other results match up to those in previous studies. Therefore, its justification is
one of plausible cause.
The conclusion of this paper leaves room for further research to build upon the findings of
the study. As stated previously, in future research, through more precise data mining and contact
with teams directly, the necessary data to factor in the variable for home attendance can be found
to improve results and draw a more direct comparison to past studies. In addition, future research
might allow for a more detailed breakdown of the disparity amongst black and white basketball
salaries. In the Hamilton (1997) study, a quantile regression was carried out in order to show the
distribution of the disparity amongst the range of professional salaries. Given more time,

information, and resources, the distribution for the 2011-2012 can be found to determine the
extremity of racial discrimination amongst the varying ranges of professional salaries.

Appendix A: Variable Description, Data Source, and Expected Sign
ACRONYM

DESCRIPTION

DATA SOURCE

EXPECTED
SIGN

SALARY

Annual salary paid to each player

ESPN, Basketball-Reference.com

N/A

RACE

The ethnicity of a player measured as: White (0) or
Black (1)

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

-

POS

The designated position of a player, measured as:
Guard (0) or Forward (1)

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

SEAS

The total number of seasons a player has played in
the ABA/NBA; representational of their years of
experience

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

MPG

The average minutes per game a player played

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

PPG

The average points per game a player scored

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

FT_

The player's freethrow percentage for the season

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

APG

The average assists per game a player has

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

RPG

The average rebounds per game a player has.
**Rebounds are not broken down into defensive or
offensive rebounds but counted as a whole instead

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

BPG

The average blocks per game a player has

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

SPG

The average steals per game a player has

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+

PF

The player's total personal fouls for the season

ESPN, BasketballReference.com, NBAstuffer.com

+/-
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